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HEAVILY CITED ARTICLES IN LAW
WILLIAM M. LANDES* AND RICHARD A. POSNER**
We are enthusiasts for studies of citations, scholarly citations as
well as judicial, as a mode of legal scholarship. We believe that such
studies can yield insights into both legal process and academic law and
that they can also be useful tools for evaluating legal scholars (for
purposes of promotions and prizes), judges, and even entire courts.1
We therefore welcome Shapiro's latest study of heavily cited law
articles 2 and offer a few observations about the study itself and then a
few observations based on the data in it.
I.
We have four concerns with Shapiro's methodology. 3 The first is
the ranking of individual articles rather than scholars; the second is
the failure to take account of differences among articles in their age or
the time since publication; the third is the exclusion of books; and the
fourth is the exclusion of articles more than half the citations to which
appear in nonlegal journals. Taking these problems in reverse order,
we point out that as a result of the last exclusion, Gary Becker's fa-
mous article on the economics of criminal punishment 4 is not included
in Shapiro's list of the one hundred most-cited law review articles in
* Clifton R. Musser Professor of Economics, University of Chicago Law School.
** Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and Senior Lecturer, Uni-
versity of Chicago Law School. The authors wish to thank Fred Shapiro for helpful comments
and Kevin Cremin for his excellent research assistance.
1. See the following joint articles: Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis,
19 J.L. & ECON. 249 (1976); Legal Change, Judicial Behavior, and the Diversity Jurisdiction, 9 J.
LEGAL STUD. 367 (1980); The Influence of Economics on Law: A Quantitative Study, 36 J.L. &
ECON. 385 (1993); see also William M. Landes et al., Judicial Reputation: A Citation Analysis of
Federal Courts of Appeals Judges, J. LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 1996); RICHARD A. POSNER,
CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 74-91 (1990); POSNER, AGING AND OLD AGE 181-92
(1995); POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM ch. 7 (2d ed. forthcoming
1996); Posner, The Hand Biography and the Question of Judicial Greatness, 104 YALE L.J. 511,
534-40 (1994).
2. Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles Revisited, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
751 (1996).
3. We illustrate these problems with reference to Shapiro's list of the top 100 articles of all
time, rather than his list of the top 10 articles in each year from 1982 to 1991, although our
criticisms apply to the second list as well. The top 100 list (as we call it) actually includes 103
articles because four are tied at the bottom.
4. Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169
(1968).
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history, although, were it not for the exclusion, its 285 law review (in-
cluding "law and" journal) citations would place it 45th in the list.
Shapiro's procedure thus penalizes an article for having too many cita-
tions. Had Becker's article been less influential outside law and as a
result had received fewer citations to nonlegal than to legal journals, it
would have made Shapiro's top one hundred. He might reply that he
is interested only in articles the primary impact of which is on legal
scholarship. But the impact of an article on legal scholarship is not
diminished by its impact on other fields. In any event, if all that Sha-
piro is interested in is the impact of an article on legal scholarship,
why does he count, in making up his rankings, all citations to eligible
articles? Why not count only citations in law journals?
The exclusion of books from Shapiro's rankings disregards, as he
recognizes, substitutability between books and articles. On the one
hand, when a book incorporates materials previously published in ar-
ticle form, the author depreciates his own articles by publishing the
book. An example is Steven Shavell's book Economic Analysis of Ac-
cident Law, published in 1987. None of Shavell's influential articles
on torts appears in Shapiro's top one hundred because, we conjecture,
since 1987 scholars have cited Shavell's book (177 times) rather than
the articles, which the book superseded. On the other hand, when a
book is new from the ground up, the author almost certainly took time
away from writing articles to write it. Academic books and academic
articles are directed to the same audience, and so they are substitutes
in demand as well as in supply. It is no more difficult to compile a list
of the most-cited books in law than a list of the most-cited articles.
We offer a few examples: Calabresi's The Cost of Accidents has been
cited 864 times; Tribe's American Constitutional Law, 2,917 times;
Dworkin's Taking Rights Seriously, 1,714 times and Law's Empire, 699
times; Ely's Democracy and Distrust, 1,516 times; and MacKinnon's
Feminism Unmodified, 513 times. The inclusion of citations to books
would yield a different picture of influential scholarship from that
sketched by Shapiro's articles. Dworkin, for example, one of the most
influential legal academics of the last half century, does not appear at
all on Shapiro's lists.
A difficulty in ranking articles meaningfully is that the number of
citations an article receives depends not just on its influence but also
on its age. Other things the same, the longer the period of time since
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an article's publication, the more citations it will accrue.5 Thus, two
articles could be equally influential in the sense of having an equal
number of lifetime citations yet the older article would have more to-
tal citations at the present time. Comparing articles of different vin-
tages is comparing apples and oranges. Later we take a stab at
correcting for differences in age by presenting projections of lifetime
citations for articles on Shapiro's list of the ten most-cited articles in
each year from 1982 through 1991.
The most questionable feature of Shapiro's method may be the
ordering of articles rather than of authors. (It is related to his exclu-
sion of books.) Ranking articles is not well-suited to the central pur-
pose of analyzing citations to scholarly work, which is to construct a
meaningful (not definitive) quantitative measure of a scholar's influ-
ence or reputation. Someone who wrote two articles each of which
had been cited two hundred times would not appear on Shapiro's lists,
even though he would almost certainly be a more considerable scholar
than one who had written a single article in his entire career which
had been cited two hundred and fifty times and therefore ranked 64th
on the list.
Consider in this regard what happens when citations to an au-
thor's articles in Shapiro's top one hundred list are aggregated. Henry
Hart has four articles in the list. None ranks higher than twenty five.
Yet, when aggregated, the four articles yield 1,247 citations, which
moves Hart into second place if authors rather than articles are
ranked. Wechsler has two articles in the top one hundred, but falls to
third place when the aggregative method is used, with 1,210 citations.
Michelman, Calabresi, and Ely move to fourth, fifth, and sixth place
respectively while Gunther falls to seventh. Charles Reich, an exam-
ple of the scholar who produces a single influential article in his life-
time, falls from fourth to thirteenth place. Shapiro's method fails to
measure even average quality, because it contains no information
about other articles written by the scholars on his lists.
Related to the last point is the fact that the average article in
Shapiro's list is 54 pages long but the range is from 11 to 177 pages.
One expects that, other things being equal, a longer article, like a
book or a longer versus a shorter judicial opinion, will be cited more
frequently. Often an author has a choice whether to incorporate sev-
eral points into a large article or make each one the subject of a sepa-
5. This does not apply to articles written before 1956, the first year of the Social Science
Citation Index (SSCI), since Shapiro's count of citations is drawn from the SSCI.
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rate, short article. The choice has very little significance in terms of
the author's scholarly quality or influence, yet it will affect both the
likelihood that an article will make Shapiro's list and the ordering of
articles on the list. It is surprising, therefore, that there is no signifi-
cant correlation between page length and citations in Shapiro's two
lists. For the top one hundred of all time the correlation coefficient is
-. 04 and for the top articles from 1982 through 1991 it is -. 09, though
neither coefficient is statistically significant. This does not mean, how-
ever, that overall the correlation between page length and citations is
nonpositive for legal articles. Shapiro's lists include only heavily cited
articles, rather than a random sample of articles. Longer articles may
be more likely to make these lists, but there need not be any positive
correlation between the length of the articles and the number of them.
Only the first criticism that we have made touches Shapiro's arti-
cle if his only goal was to identify the most influential law review arti-
cles in history. Anyone familiar with legal scholarship will recognize a
number of articles on Shapiro's list of the one hundred most-cited arti-
cles as articles that have profoundly influenced legal scholarship. The
question is the utility of such a list for legal scholarship itself. What
can we infer from it about legal scholarship? Perhaps little, because of
the methodological problems that we have noted.
None of our criticisms, we emphasize, are criticisms of citations
analysis, or of citations as a proxy for quality, influence, or reputation.
Our criticisms are of specific methodological choices made by Sha-
piro, rather than of the fundamental methodology of citations
analysis.
II.
Enough criticism; let us try to be constructive. We may be able to
learn something about legal scholarship by considering the probability
that a given article will rank in the top one hundred. This depends, of
course, on the number of law articles that have ever been published.
The number is not known with precision but is clearly so large that the
probability that an article will achieve such a ranking is exceedingly
small. Using Westlaw's Legal Resource Index, we are able to estimate
the number of law-related articles (we exclude book reviews, tran-
scripts, editorials, case notes, and obituaries but include student-writ-
ten notes and comments, which are a large fraction of all scholarly
works in law reviews) published in United States law reviews and law
journals (and other journals containing law-related articles) from 1980
[Vol. 71:825
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to 1994.6 That number is 212,924, and there is an upward trend, from
11,623 articles in 1980 to 15,211 in 1994. A regression of the form log
A = bo + bit + u for the time period (t) 1980 to 1994 explained 66% of
the variance in the natural logarithm of articles (A) and yielded a pos-
itive and highly significant annual growth rate of 1.67%. Next we pro-
jected backwards to 1956 to estimate the number of articles published
annually between 1955 and 1980.7 Using this method and excluding
74,859 articles published in the years 1990 to 1994 (because five years
is typically not long enough for even a heavily cited legal article to
accumulate two hundred or more citations), we estimate that the total
number of law-related articles published from 1956 through 1989 and
thus eligible for top one hundred billing equals 385,320. This trans-
lates into a probability of making the top one hundred list of slightly
more than one in four thousand. The probability would be higher, but
still very small, if student-written work were excluded, as it should be
since it is not included in Shapiro's lists. Considering the vast number
of citations contained in almost 400,000 articles (not to mention non-
law-review articles that cite legal articles), it is surprising that so few
articles manage to accrete 204 citations (the cutoff number in the top
one hundred list). The implication is that law is a relatively decentral-
ized and competitive field of scholarship, as distinct from one domi-
nated by a handful of scholars to whom the rest defer.
III.
So far we have been focusing on Shapiro's first list, the list of the
all-time one hundred most-cited articles. He has a second list, which
is confined to articles published between 1982 and 1991, and a striking
difference between the two lists is the declining influence of doctrinal
articles and the increasing influence of "law and" articles suggested by
the second list. Table 1 below shows that doctrinal articles comprise
nearly 60% of the articles in the all-time top one hundred list but only
26% of the one hundred most-cited recent articles. Table 1 also shows
that the most cited recent articles are increasingly drawn from law and
political theory, critical legal studies, critical race theory, and feminist
jurisprudence, but not from law and economics, which is at about the
same level in both lists.8 In our own citation analysis of legal scholar-
ship, we also found a decline in doctrinal and an increase in "law and"
6. The Legal Resource Index begins with articles indexed after December 1979.
7. Recall that Shapiro did not count citations before 1956.
8. Only a few "law and other social sciences" articles make either list, so we do not discuss
that field.
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scholarship. 9 Like Shapiro, we found no growth in the influence of
doctrinal scholarship and significant increases in the influence of femi-
nist theory, critical legal studies, and law and political theory. But
unlike him we found no decline in the impact of law and economics.
During both the entire period covered by our study, 1976-1990, and
the period just since 1983, we found that citations to law and econom-
ics scholars grew more rapidly than citations to scholars in other "law
and" fields. We have no explanation for this discrepancy. But we be-
lieve that our results are more reliable because we did not arbitrarily
truncate our sample at a subset (the one hundred most-cited) of a
subset (articles more than 50% of the citations to which appear in law
journals) of a subset (articles as distinct from articles plus books).
TABLE 1
Distribution of Articles By Type
Type Top 100 Most Recent
Doctrinal .60 .26
Law & Economics .17 .16
Law & Political Theory .08 .19
Law & Social Sciences .04 .01
Critical Legal Studies .09 .26
Feminist Theory .02 .13
As noted earlier, the number of citations an article receives de-
pends, in part, on its age. The typical article on the top one hundred
list was written in 1967 (the median article in 1971), compared to 1986
for the most recent list, and has therefore had more time to accumu-
late citations. Not surprisingly, the average number of citations to an
article on the former list is considerably greater than to one on the
latter list-335 versus 140. Yet an article on the second list with 140
citations may ultimately turn out to be more influential than one on
the first list with 335 citations. We can use regression analysis to cor-
rect for differences in age among articles on both lists, thus allowing
for meaningful comparisons of articles of different vintages. Con-
cretely, we estimate how many articles on the most recent list are
likely to accumulate at least 204 citations in their lifetime.' 0 Like in-
9. See The Influence of Economics on Law: A Quantitative Study, supra note 1, at 399-400.
10. The "lifetime" of an article is not a well-defined concept, since intellectual property
does not "die." Most writers on citations, therefore, prefer to use half lives (the period over
which a work is likely to accrue one half its total citations) as a measure of longevity. This
refinement is not important to our analysis. But it is important to bear in mind that the lifetime
citations to articles on the top-100-of-all-time list will increase with the passage of time and
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tellectual and other human (or for that matter physical) capital in gen-
eral, the typical article will depreciate with age. A ten-year-old article
is less likely to be cited today than a nine-year-old article, and so
forth. Total citations to an article will increase as the time from publi-
cation lengthens, but will do so at a decreasing rate as a consequence
of depreciation.
A simple regression specification that captures this process is
1n Ci = bo + blTi + b2T 2 + ui (1)
where In Ci denotes the natural logarithm of total citations to the ith
article, T equals 1994 minus the year in which the article was pub-
lished, and ui is a random error term.1' We predict that b, > 0 and b2 <
0, which together express the fact that citations increase over time but
at a declining rate. 12
We estimated equation (1) for articles on Shapiro's second list (so
T, ranges from 3 for an article published in 1991 to 12 for an article
published in 1972):
In Ci = 3.164 + .365TI - .017Ti2  R2 = .56 (2)
(14.21) (5.62) (3.90)
Both b, and b2 have the expected signs and are statistically significant
(t-statistics are in parentheses). These coefficients enable us to predict
the number of citations an article published n years ago will accumu-
late in its lifetime where n is between 3 and 12.13 The projected life-
time citations to the 103 articles on the list range from 95 to 351, while
the number of citations to date to these articles ranges from 45 to 327.
Of the 103 articles, 14 already have accumulated 204 or more cita-
tions, and we estimate that 16 of the remaining 89 articles will also
reach that level. In sum, about 30% of the articles on the most recent
list should accumulate 204 or more citations.14 The 16 articles that we
hence that the minimum number of citations necessary to qualify an article for the top 100 will
increase over time beyond 204.
11. For a more complete discussion of the relation between the regression specification and
the human capital model, see our article, The Influence of Economics on Law: A Quantitative
Study, supra note 1, at 395-98.
12. An obvious problem with this simple quadratic specification is that eventually total cita-
tions will (contrary to reality) decline as time increases, because the negative coefficient on T2
will dominate the positive coefficient on T. In equation (2) this point occurs after 11 years.
13. To calculate lifetime citations per article we estimated the ratio of predicted citations
after 11 years to total citations for an article written n (< 11) years ago. For each year from 1984
to 1991 we estimated a separate ratio and assumed that the ratio was one for articles written in
1982 and 1983. We then multiplied the appropriate ratio by an article's actual citations to esti-
mate its lifetime citations. This is clearly a rough method of estimations because citations will
tend to increase (though slowly) beyond 11 years.
14. The list is attached as Appendix 1.
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predict will accumulate 204 citations could be added to the list of the
"all time" top one hundred, enabling a comparison between articles of
different vintages.
IV.
Last we consider the interesting issue of the relation between age
and creativity. An extensive literature documents the large variance
in peak ages of creativity or productivity in different fields of en-
deavor. The highlights of that literature are summarized in Table 2.
In general, the more rapidly a field of scholarship changes and the
more it involves the manipulation of abstract symbols (as illustrated
by mathematics), the lower the age peak, while the more slowly a field
changes and the more it involves judgment, experience, and accumu-
lated knowledge, the higher the age peak.
HEAVILY CITED ARTICLES IN LAW
TABLE 2
Peak Age of Productivity
Age Decade with Creative
Highest Percentage Nonlinear Estimations Half-life
Profession of Total Output15  (Chronological Age) 16  (Career Age) 17
Scholarship 60s -
Historians 60s 58.5 39.7
Philosophers 60s 60.1 30.1
Scholars 40s & 50s 51.4 24.8
Sciences 40s - -
Biologists 40s 43.9 21.0
Botanists 40s, 50s, & 60s 53.5 26.7
Chemists 40s 40.4 16.5
Geologists 50s 54.8 28.9
Inventors 60s 109.818 86.6
Mathematicians 30s & 40s 46.5 21.7
Arts 40s - -
Architects 40s 38.4 13.6
Chamber Musicians 30s 35.7 43.3
Dramatists 40s 36.5 12.2
Librettists 40s 39.4 14.4
Novelists 50s 47.1 20.4
Opera Composer 40s 36.3 12.0
Poets 40s 40.1 15.4
The subject matter of law changes rapidly, but conventional legal
scholarship relies much more heavily on judgment and memory than
on anything that much resembles mathematical skills; and judging is a
famously geriatric profession. So one might expect the peak age of
legal scholars to be high-yet to be lower in the interdisciplinary fields
of legal studies, especially law and economics (a field that, obviously,
draws very heavily on economics, which is an increasingly mathema-
15. Wayne Dennis, Creative Productivity Between the Ages of 20 and 80 Years, J.
GERONTOLOGY 1, 2 (table 1) (1966). Dennis points out two limitations of the data: subjects
within the various professions "are not uniform with regard to their degree of eminence," and
"the limits of productivity employed for the different groups are also unequal." Id. at 3.
16. Dean Keith Simonton, Age and Creative Productivity: Nonlinear Estimation of an
Information-Processing Model, 29 INT'L J. AGING & HUMAN DEV. 23, 29 (table 1) (1989)
(nonlinear estimates for 16 longitudinal times series, using data found in Dennis, supra note 15).
17. Id. At N="career age," half the initial creative potential of an individual will have been
consumed.
18. This odd result is the artifact of a time series in which the age curve is monotonically
increasing throughout the age range of the sample. Id. at 30.
19961
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
tized field), and therefore to be falling as legal scholarship shifts to-
ward the interdisciplinary. 19
As shown in Table 3, the average age of the 109 authors (includ-
ing coauthors) in Shapiro's top one hundred list when they wrote the
article listed was 42.7 for the sample as a whole. This suggests that law
is about midway between very low peak-age fields such as mathemat-
ics and very high ones such as history and philosophy.
19. A shift documented-using citation analysis, of course-in our article on the influence
of economics on law, supra note 1, at 416-24. It is also shown infra in Table 3, drawn from
Shapiro's study.
(Vol. 71:825
HEAVILY CITED ARTICLES IN LAW
TABLE 3
Age Distribution of Authors20
Top 100 Recent Articles
Total
age 42.7 38.2
std. deviation 12.0 6.6
range 27-89 26-60
number 109 109
Doctrinal
age 45.3 38.2
std. deviation 13.2 7.8
range 28-89 27-60
number 65 28
Law & Econ.
age 36.3 38.2
std. deviation 6.1 5.6
range 27-50 30-48
number 19 17
Law & Political Theory
age 45.2 39.2
std. deviation 15.0 5.5
range 28-76 29-50
number 9 21
Law & Social Sciences
age 40.0 52
std. deviation 9.4
range 32-52
number 4 1
Critical Legal Studies
age 37.7 38.2
std. deviation 3.3 7.5
range 33-44 26-52
number 10 28
Feminist Theory
age 37.5 35.8
std. deviation .7 3.7
range 37-38 30-45
number 2 14
20. In this table, "range" denotes the minimum and maximum ages of authors for the type
of scholarship in question and "number" denotes the number of authors, including coauthors.
The subject matter breakdowns are the same as we used in our article on the influence of
economics of law. See supra note 1.
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But in trying to evaluate the significance of these figures one runs
up against the problems with Shapiro's method that we discussed at
the outset. Not only is a lot of information missing about the actual
citations-weighted output of the scholars on his list, but the exclusion
of books imparts a systematic downward bias to the age of the au-
thors. Particularly in law, a field in which most scholars do not have
doctoral degrees, a scholar writes articles before he writes books. Un-
til one has written a number of articles one is unlikely to have either
sufficient reputation to interest a book publisher or sufficient writing
experience to be able to write a publishable book. Also, many books
in law, as in other fields, are based on invited lectures, and the invita-
tions are tendered to established scholars rather than to novices. No
one who was interested in the age profile of creativity or productivity,
in a field in which books were a major vehicle for the publication of
scholarship, would exclude books in calculating citation-weighted
scholarly output.
Let us set our misgivings to one side, however, and look more
closely at Table 3. The table reveals a lower peak age for "law and"
fields than for doctrinal scholarship, and this is what we would expect.
It is true that some of these fields, such as critical legal studies and
feminist jurisprudence, are not mathematized and so are not intrinsi-
cally early-peak fields. But any new field, regardless of its analytic
character, is apt to be disproportionately populated by the young; and
these are new fields (newer than law and economics, for example).
Both the economic theory of human capital and the psychologists' dis-
tinction between "fluid" and "crystallized" intelligence predict that
new fields will be more attractive to young than to old because the
cost (broadly conceived) of retooling for a new field is likely to be
very high for older people.21 Moreover, the returns from investing are
likely to be lower because there are fewer periods over which they can
be earned. Finally, in any field in which experience counts, the young
will be at a disadvantage in competing with the old, so it makes sense
for the young to look for different fields, fields unexplored by their
elders, to work in.
We can gain further insight into the age profiles of different types
of legal scholarship by comparing the standard deviations (or ranges)
of authors' ages in the different fields. The standard deviation of the
age of authors of doctrinal articles is 13.2 years, meaning that roughly
two-thirds of the authors were between thirty three and fifty when
21. See POSNER, AGING AND OLD AGE, supra note 1, esp. 66-95.
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they wrote their top one hundred article. So wide a range suggests
that legal doctrinal scholarship is not one of those fields in which crea-
tivity is highly correlated with age. It can be done well by old and
young alike, which is consistent with the curious combination of (old)
judges and (young) law clerks in the judiciary. We also find that the
age distribution of authors of law-and-political-theory articles is simi-
lar to that of doctrinal articles, suggesting that this field too is neither
new nor technical. The standard deviations of the ages of the law and
economics and critical legal studies authors are much smaller (6.1 and
3.3 years). Both law and economics and critical legal studies were rel-
atively new fields when the typical article in the top one hundred was
published. (The average publication date independent of field is 1967,
but for law and economics and critical legal studies articles it is 1973
and 1981, respectively.) One is not surprised to find either field domi-
nated by young scholars, and hence the range of ages would be ex-
pected to be narrow. The significant mathematical component in
economic creativity is another reason to expect a low average age of
authors of law and economics articles-and also a reason to predict
that as the other "law and" fields (which are not mathematical) ma-
ture, the ratio of the average age of authors of top-ranked articles in
those fields will rise relative to the average age of authors of top-
ranked law and economics articles.
Table 3 also includes data from Shapiro's second list, the top-
ranking articles in recent years. Notice the sharp drop in the age and
standard deviation of both doctrinal and law-and-political-theory
scholars. The mean ages and standard deviations (in parentheses) fall
from 45.3 to 38.2 (13.2 to 7.8) for the former and from 45.2 to 39.2
(15.0 to 5.5) for the latter. (There is little change in peak age in the
other fields.) One possible explanation is that these fields are becom-
ing more interdisciplinary, and, specifically, are drawing more on eco-
nomics and related mathematized fields such as public choice and
game theory; another and consistent possibility is that law faculty is
being recruited at younger ages. No longer are faculty expected to
have "apprenticed" at law firms after graduation from law school.
Coming into teaching either younger or with more scholarly training
(for example, graduate training in another field, often culminating in a
Ph.D.), modem law faculty are likely to begin writing at an earlier age
even if what they do is classified as doctrinal scholarship. In sum, Sha-
piro's study provides some evidence that the peak age of scholarly
productivity in law is inverse to interdisciplinarity, as theory predicts.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [
APPENDIX
The table below lists the predicted "lifetime" citations for all arti-
cles on Shapiro's list of the most-cited law review articles of recent
years. For each article, we note the year of publication, its rank in that
year, its actual number of citations and its predicted number of total
("lifetime") citations. The predictions are derived from equation (2)
in the text.
TABLE 4
Author Year Rank Cites Predicted Citations
1 Matsuda, M. 1989 1 193 351
2 Lawrence, C. 1987 1 253 330
3 Michelman, F. 1986 1 282 327
4 Unger, R. 1983 1 327 327
5 Sunstein, C. 1985 1 301 322
6 Harris. A. 1990 1 142 320
7 Sunstein, C. 1988 1 208 315
8 Minow, M. 1987 2 238 310
9 Amar, A. 1991 1 106 307
10 Michelman, F. 1988 2 200 303
11 Crenshaw, K. 1988 3 195 295
12 Cover, R. 1983 2 291 291
13 Bartlett, K. 1990 2 129 291
14 Tushnet, M. 1983 3 268 268
15 Sunstein, C. 1989 2 145 264
16 Fiss, 0. 1982 1 253 257
17 West, R. 1988 4 166 251
18 Galanter, M. 1983 4 249 249
19 Ackerman, B. 1984 1 243 247
20 Eskridge, W. 1990 3 107 241
21 Lawrence, C. 1990 4 105 237
22 Radin, M. 1987 3 179 233
23 Olsen, F. 1983 5 224 224
24 Delgado, R. 1989 3 123 224
25 Macey, J. 1986 2 192 223
26 Scalia, A. 1989 4 117 213
27 Eskridge, W. 1990 5 94 212
28 Priest, G. 1984 2 204 207
29 Singer, J. 1984 3 203 206
30 MacKinnon, C. 1983 6 205 205
31 Fiss, 0. 1984 4 198 201
32 Sunstein, C. 1987 4 151 197
33 Easterbrook, F. 1982 2 193 196
34 Easterbrook, F. 1984 5 191 194
35 MacKinnon, C. 1982 3 186 189
36 Weiler, P. 1983 7 189 189
37 Sherry, S. 1986 3 162 188
38 Matsuda, M. 1987 5 143 186
39 Williams, P. 1987 5 143 186
40 Eskridge, W. 1987 7 141 184
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Author
41 Gordon, R.
42 Western, P.
43 Peller, G.
44 Williams, J.
45 Easterbrook, F.
46 Powell, H.
47 Kennedy, D.
48 Ayres, I.
49 Amar, A.
50 Crenshaw, K.
51 Kennedy, R.
52 Sunstein, C.
53 Stewart, R.
54 Rosenberg, D.
55 Sunstein, C.
56 Farber, D.
57 Frug, G.
58 Gilson, R.
59 Ackerman, B.
60 Matsuda, M.
61 Roberts, D.
62 Shavell, S.
63 MacKinnon, C.
64 Roe, M.
65 Resnik, J.
66 Chayes, A.
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